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Abstract 
The EU’s newly established diplomatic service, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), has attracted research interest from several sub-disciplines in political science 
and law. Two gaps in the contemporary literature, however, persist: i) a lack of empirical 
data on the establishment and organisation of the service, and ii) a dearth of theoretical 
research programmes that aim at ‘contextualizing’ the EEAS within broader conceptual 
debates in international relations, public administration, and law. This research note 
seeks to remedy these shortcomings by studying how national administrations reacted 
and adapted to the first waves of recruitment within the EEAS using a unique new 
dataset on the recruitment of member-state diplomats to the EEAS. It thus explores an 
empirical issue that was widely discussed among both academic and non-academic 
observers, and represented a key practical question for many national foreign 
ministries, at the time of the EEAS’ launch. Our analysis indicates that, contrary to early 
fears of ‘colonialisation’ of the EEAS through member-states diplomats, the EEAS has 
managed to hold a firm grip on the recruitment process, which overall has been largely 
informed by European Commission recruitment procedures and practices thus far.  
Introduction 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is one of the – if not the – most important 
innovation(s) of the EU’s post-Lisbon institutional architecture in external relations. The 
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making of this ‘institution’ sui generis – composed of members from the European 
Commission (Commission), the (Union) Council Secretariat as well as the national diplomatic 
services of the member-states – does not only transcend well-established boundaries of 
supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism within the EU, it also fuses different 
administrative apparatuses and bureaucratic logics (Wessels 1997). The institutional 
experiment that the EEAS therefore represents has become a focal point of significant 
research interest across several (sub)disciplines.  
From the point of view of international law, scholars discuss whether the EEAS 
constitutes an ‘EU organ’ (Sichel 2011), ‘hybrid body’ (Carta 2012: 167), or an 
‘interstitial’ (Bàtora 2013) diplomatic body, and what its exact legal structure implies for 
its expected functioning. From the perspective of International Relations (IR) and diplomacy 
studies, the EEAS has raised questions its role in fostering coherence within the EU system of 
governance (Furness 2012 and 2013; Gebhard 2011)), improving the effectiveness of EU 
foreign policy by better linking external economic, foreign, security, defence and 
development (Smith 2013)) or inducing some degree of democratization in EU foreign policy 
(Bàtora 2011; Raube 2012; Wisniewski 2013). Finally, from the point of view of public 
administration (PA) scholarship, the EEAS has been viewed as a case of organizational 
capacity-building with important effects for staff recruitment and socialization (Cross 2011; 
Benson-Rea and Shore 2012; Juncos and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 
2013).  
Unfortunately, however, the EEAS as a ‘promising research project [allowing] to study, live, 
the creation, institutionalization and socializing process of a new European institution’ (Nivet 
2011: 11) remains under-theorized and thus conceptually underdeveloped, and also 
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empirically embryonic due to the lack of data. In this research note, we seek to start 
addressing these twofold deficiencies. First, we analyse an important aspect of the 
institutionalization of the EEAS – i.e. recruitment to the EEAS (see also Cross 2011) – in a 
theoretically well-informed way. Second, we report a unique new dataset based on 
interviews with official experts in charge of the temporary assignment of diplomats to the 
EEAS from all member-states as well as the EEAS HR department. Hence, this research note 
adds to the nascent literature by providing an in-depth empirical analysis of the first 
rounds of recruitment of EU member-state officials into the EEAS, such as to evaluate 
how national administrations reacted and adapted to the first waves of recruitment 
within the EEAS. This provides important insights concerning the national endorsement 
and appropriation of the new service: i.e., how member states perceive the new service, 
and whether EEAS’s recruitment policy remains independent of member-state influence.1 
Secondly, this endeavour also has an ambition to suggest a research agenda. As such, we 
hope to start building a bridge between the more ‘normative’ IR scholarship – which 
predominantly concentrates on what EEAS represents for the EUs’ global role – and the 
more ‘positivist’ PA and law scholarship – which focuses more on the ’operational’ aspects of 
the EEAS.  
From the perspective of organizational and institutional theories, the process of 
recruitment of EEAS staff is critical because it provides important information about the 
extent to which EEAS’ capacities in foreign relations - a policy field historically marked 
by national control and a lack of EU capacity - remain at arm’s length from the Council 
and member-states’ influence, and thus features a transformation of European political 
order (Olsen 2007). The data reported below suggest first that the EEAS has maintained 
extensive independence in this regard when it comes to the recruitment of EEAS 
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personnel during the first hiring rounds. Second, this independence seems to be 
predominantly facilitated by two conditions:  
- the supply of administrative capacities and practices at EU level on the one hand, and 
- the pre-existing organizational traditions, practices and formats on the other hand, 
notably within the Commission, but also within member-states governments 
themselves. 
The article proceeds in the following steps: The next section shortly contextualizes the 
EEAS by providing a brief historical snapshot of its emergence. The following two 
sections suggest how pre-existing administrative capacities at EU and national levels 
supplied the EEAS with a capacity to act relatively independent when recruiting its first 
administrative personnel. 
 
Contextualizing the EEAS 
Although the need for some form of diplomatic service in the EU has been debated for 
some time (see Carta 2012: 55ff.), the first concrete proposal was only brought up 
during the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’, which took place from December 2001 
to July 2003. However, after the blatant failure of the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe’, deliberations on EEAS in diplomatic circles of the EU and member-states 
were temporarily and officially shelved, yet not completely (see Duke 2009: 214). Only 
after the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified, discussions were officially resumed and the 
institutional design of the new service was negotiated between the HR/VP Baroness 
Ashton, the Commission, the Council, the member-states and the European Parliament.  
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According to Regulation No 1080/2010 of 24 November 2010 of the European 
Parliament and the Council, member-state officials should make up 33 per cent of EEAS 
AD-level staff. However, reaching agreement on such staffing and personnel issues 
involved in the EEAS was one of the most difficult key themes tackled during the 
negotiations. For instance, the design of the organigramme was strategically avoided for 
both political and legal reasons and did not even feature in the agreement formalized by 
the Parliament’s Plenary on 8 July 2010 (e.g., Art. 4 and 5 of the Formal Agreement of 
July 2010). One of the reasons behind this absence lay in the overt ambitions regarding 
posts and positions in the EEAS displayed by all member-states already during the 
negotiations, which made the organigramme politically divisive. This, however, directly 
raises the question how these expressed desires on the side of the member-states 
translate into their policies and strategies regarding the staffing of the EEAS, and to 
which extent it influences recruitment within the EEAS. Furthermore, the fact that its 
staff hails from three different institutional settings may have significant implications 
for the diplomatic services of the member-states in the medium- and long-term.  
Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 31 coordinators of the temporary assignment of 
diplomats to the EEAS from all member-states as well as the EEAS HR department, we 
present below our findings of how member-states have approached the first rounds of staff 
hires to the EEAS and how they sought  to ensure their influence at the EU-level.2 
 
Administrative capacities and pre-existing organizational formats for 
recruitment to the EEAS 
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One of the first observations mentioned by most of our interviewees when discussing 
the organizational architecture and procedure of recruitment of member-state officials 
to the EEAS is how strongly it builds on pre-existing procedures and processes 
employed within the Commission. This empirical finding is most relevant for the first 
hiring round for member-state officials in January-March 2010, since it was effectively 
organised by opening the Commission’s internal rotation system – through which EU 
officials change post on a regular basis within its missions – ‘for the first time also to 
candidates from the two other sources (Council Secretariat General, member-states)’ 
(European Union 2010: 2).3 Although this was no longer the case in the second hiring 
round starting in the summer of 2010, many of the Commission’s procedures for 
recruitment were retained at this point. For instance, the EEAS’ HR directorate 
continued to impose upon applicants the Commission style of composing and preparing 
the application dossiers and pre-selected among the candidates according to the 
Commission’s point system (essentially translating the candidate’s CV into a numerical 
score depending on the requirements of the job opening). Moreover, no positions were 
advertised in ‘the organizational chart related to HR’ (Interview 19), such that the same 
‘people who were managing for the Commission, its human resources for delegations 
abroad’ (Interviews 11, 19) remained in charge of EEAS’ recruitment. All in all, it was a 
system ‘fundamentally geared towards continuation as a Commission body’ (Interview 
11), thus suggesting that the organization of the recruitment was profoundly shaped by 
pre-existing organizational forms within the Commission. 
The EEAS also acted as a strict agenda-setter in both the timing of vacancy calls relative 
to their application deadlines (with often very short application windows) and the 
provision of candidates’ information relative to the sequencing of interviews with 
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information often reaching member-states’ representatives in the (pre)selection panels 
only a few days before the recruitment committee meeting. Such tight control over the 
agenda, and the apparent strategic use thereof, by the EEAS obviously had a vast impact 
on member-states’ capacities for action. Moreover, by limiting the number of vacancy 
calls ‘in the central office, where (…) policy decisions are made’ (Interview 27) and 
excluding positions related to the HR directorate, the EEAS not only illustrated its 
independence in deciding about the recruitment process, but simultaneously signalled 
its desire to remain independent also in its future decision-making behaviour. 
Our data also suggest that the administrative capacities of the Commission in the 
recruitment process of EEAS personnel correspondingly weakened the influence of 
small member-states with comparatively fewer administrative capacities. These 
member-states effectively were forced to rely on individuals themselves to make good 
applications, rather than have the ability to provide a broad-based support structure – 
as occurs in various larger member-states. While such organizational ‘copy-paste’ 
(Interviews 7, 15, 19) from already existing formats can be explained by the urgency with 
which these procedures were put together, the EEAS appears to also have taken a 
number of strategic decisions in its recruitment procedures to retain a strong position 
relative to the member-states. First, while information about the application process and 
recruitment outcomes is critical for member-states to optimise their approach and 
strategy towards vacancy calls in the EEAS and be able to have an influence on EEAS’ 
recruitment process (see above), such information was generally deemed by member-
states to be ‘not moving freely’ (Interview 20, but noted by most respondents). For 
instance, prior to the first hiring round, member-states ‘were not at all aware of the 
selection procedures and methods the EEAS was going to adopt’ (Interview 19) and felt 
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that this ‘leaves our applicants unprepared for the interview, for the whole procedure’ 
(Interview 29). Similarly, information about the reasons behind an applicant’s failure to 
be (pre-)selected could often only be obtained by personally contacting the EEAS: ‘it was 
not systematic’ (Interview 20, also Interview 26). Although such informational 
breakdowns might be expected given that the EEAS initially had to rely on relatively few 
people and operate in a completely new institutional structure, member-states often had 
the impression that ‘there was a resistance by the EEAS to share certain kinds of 
information’ (Interview 21). Evidently, with the EEAS able to control the flow of 
information within and between institutions, it was able to retain a powerful position 
vis-à-vis the member-states (in line with the theoretical arguments regarding the 
importance of information in Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1188).  
As yet another indicator of the impact of pre-existing administrative capacities at EU-
level, individual applications were invited to be submitted directly to the EEAS, not via 
the member-states’ administrations. Even though member-states’ MFAs are required to 
provide a letter confirming the candidate’s ‘diplomatic credentials’, which might open 
for the possibility of pre-selecting potential candidates by member-states, this direct 
application system clearly implies that member-state governments would be bypassed: 
‘If you apply an open approach, you cannot really control or steer’ (Interview 4). 
Consequently, it effectively curtailed the potential influence of member-states on the 
proceedings. 
Finally, the EEAS decided upon the composition of the (pre-)selection panels, and 
thereby appeared to consistently place representatives from member-state 
governments into, at best, a minority position. In fact, member-states were ‘not 
represented in the panels for heads of division, for instance (…) not in all the middle 
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management and junior positions’ (Interview 19). When they are represented, they 
consistently faced a numerical majority from the EU institutions. For example, in the 
Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA), which appoints the Heads of Mission as 
well as posts starting at the Director level within the EEAS Headquarters, the member-
states had two representatives out of six members (the remaining four members coming 
from EEAS (2), Council (1) and Commission (1)) – with decisions requiring a two thirds 
majority. Moreover, unlike for the representatives from the EU institutions in the CCA, 
for the representatives of member-states ‘it functions on the rotation basis, so (…) 
there’s not really a consistency and coherence on who is representing’ (Interview 11; 
also Interview 4, 14). This is, however, already an improvement since no representation 
was awarded to member-states during the first hiring round (which initiated repeated 
interventions by several member-states including Austria, Denmark, France, and the 
United Kingdom) (Assemblée Nationale, 29/09/2010), nor was such participation even 
considered when Baroness Ashton first set up the CCA.4 Even so, requests for a more 
equal say were ignored by the EEAS: ‘probably the one single change which was not 
incorporated was precisely more participation’ (Interview 4). 
 
The politics of recruitment 
Regarding the politics of recruitment to the EEAS, it is illustrative to regard the relative 
importance attached by the EEAS and member-states to certain qualities of candidates, 
and how this translated into EEAS’ final recruitment decisions. We thereby concentrate 
on three such qualities: The relative emphasis that was attached to candidates’ (i) merit 
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versus nationality, (ii) technical expertise versus diplomatic qualifications, and (iii) 
previous work experience in the Brussels institutions versus elsewhere in the world. 
First, while the EEAS favoured merit over nationality, many member-states argued that 
‘this one third quota needs to be fulfilled proportionally by all member-states’ (Interview 
29), implying a need to have some degree of geographical balance. That is, ‘from a 
[country] point of view, it’s about trying to find a good [country national], but from the 
institutional point of view, it’s trying to find the best person to do the job’ (Interview 7; 
also Interview 19). The issue of nationality appeared, however, to be treated by the EEAS 
as a matter of relatively minor concern. Several respondents indeed indicated that ‘how 
the panels have been working, it has been merit proof’ (Interview 7), while geographical 
balance ‘does not seem to us to be happening right now’ (Interview 12). Hence, even 
though geographical balance may signal some degree of national ‘ownership’ of 
international institutions (see above), there is little evidence of member-states’ ability to 
impose positive weight on candidate’s nationality in this recruitment process. 
Second, technical expertise has traditionally been a key concern in Commission’s hiring 
of personnel in external relations departments, while diplomatic qualifications has 
formed a core concern for member-states’ recruitment of diplomats. These credentials, 
most often acquired at diplomatic academies and always following a highly competitive 
selection process, are often perceived as the cornerstone of the diplomatic esprit de 
corps (Hocking and Spence 2006). Following the Commission’s posting practice the 
EEAS also did put substantial weight on candidates’ technical and management 
expertise despite its formal requirement that member-state candidates should have 
relevant ‘diplomatic credentials’. As a response, several member-states allowed for a 
fairly broad and encompassing interpretation of ‘diplomatic credentials’ when deciding 
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on granting the candidate a ‘letter of support’. Such leniency in interpretation was 
thereby seen by some member-states as a key mean to ‘maximise our success possibility’ 
(Interview 19). Evidently, a lenient translation allowed sending in more applicants, 
increasing the likelihood of having at least some successful candidates for different 
member-states. However, it might also have increased member-states influence on 
EEAS’ recruitment process if EEAS conformed to this broader interpretation. Exactly 
such readjustment of the EEAS’ application requirement occurred after the first rotation. 
Although this initially suggests that member-states had at least some influence on the 
decision-process of the EEAS, the EEAS did not communicate the exact nature of these 
changes in its application requirements at the time of the change, thus generating ‘a lot 
of questions all over Europe’ (Interview 20; also Interview 3, 28). Clearly, such ambiguity 
– as when items in decision streams are deliberately decoupled (Achrill et al. 2013) – 
benefited the EEAS’ ability to retain independence of its recruitment practice, as it keeps 
member-states continuously lagging one step behind: ‘we had to improvise because the 
service improvises as well a lot’ (Interview 6). 
Finally, EEAS appears to also have stood its ground (against member-state demands) 
with respect to the importance attached to candidates’ previous work experience in the 
Brussels institutions as opposed to experiences in ‘global’ diplomacy. While experiences 
in Brussels were of lesser importance to member-states – given that countries’ 
diplomatic traditions often vary substantially from the Commission’s view of external 
relations – ‘if you look at what is making the grade in the EEAS, it is clear that having 
served in Brussels gives you an edge’ (Interview 28). 
Despite the great influence of the EEAS and the Commission on the recruitment process, 
member-states have attempted to influence the results of the recruitment process in 
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their favour. In fact, they have developed a number of strategies with exactly this aim in 
mind. The most far-reaching of these consisted of ‘a work of diligent and smart lobbying 
activities’ (Interview 5; also Interviews 14, 15, 19, 28) – although this mostly applies for 
postings at higher (political) levels. More conventionally, many member-states 
attempted to professionalize the way they manage vacancy notices from the EEAS. 
Although voluntary preparatory workshops and information booklets for EEAS 
applicants were thereby widespread (confirmed by most interviewees), bigger member-
states tended to thereby exploited well-established routines and programmes – ‘our 
career development concept, let’s say (Interview 27; also Manley 2012) – while ‘new’ and 
smaller member-states often relied on more ad hoc procedures, which in many cases 
relied more directly on input from EEAS officials. These patterns might provide an 
explanation for recent views suggesting that there is a gap between old and new 
member-states when it comes to the rate of success in terms of bringing national 
officials into the EEAS. Indeed, albeit to varying degrees, new member-states are under-
represented in the new Service: ‘Out of 134 people who applied for 10 senior 
management posts in Brussels, there were 34 “new” diplomats, 74 “old” ones and 26 EU 
officials. None of the “new” ones got through’ (Rettman 2012). Building on our interview 
data, the lack of well-established organizational capacities in new member-states to 
receive training appears to be an important factor in explaining such variation, which 
illustrates the effect of pre-existing administrative capacity for recruitment in member-
state governments.  
 
Conclusion 
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Overall, the EEAS appears to have established a firm hold over both the formal 
organizational architecture of the selection process, and the practical implementation 
thereof. As a consequence, it has been able to shield, thus far, its recruitment procedures 
and practices to a relatively large extent from member-states’ influence. The data 
suggests that the EEAS treat member-states as ‘external counterparts’, whereas 
member-states feel they ‘should be considered as full stakeholders (Interview 19). The 
relative independence of the EEAS in recruiting its own personnel is rather astonishing 
for two main reasons: First, the supply of political, administrative, and legal capacities in 
the domain of foreign and security policy has historically remained at national level until 
the emergence of the EEAS. Consequently, immediate independence of the EEAS in its 
initial recruitment is surprising. Second, the policy area covered by the EEAS is 
historically an area of great sensitivity to state power and thus less likely to experience 
supranational governance, particularly when the politico-administrative apparatus to do 
so is merely emergent.  
 
The data also shows that that the recruitment practice of EEAS personnel is 
considerably fashioned by pre-existing organizational traditions, practices and formats. 
Organizational theory ascribes an autonomous role for pre-existing organizational 
structures to account for the emergence and institutionalization of new organizational 
structures, and their effects. Particularly, during periods of rapid institutional formation 
– as faced by Europe at the time of the establishment of the EEAS – new institutional 
arrangements may be profoundly shaped by pre-existing organizational forms. 
Moreover, lack of time when creating new institutions makes decision-makers’ ‘pursuit 
of intelligence’ bounded and their search for solutions local (March 2010: 19). 
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Furthermore, the likelihood of institutional reproduction may be particularly high in cases 
with few institutional ‘models’. The article suggests that member-states with strong pre-
existing organizational capacities and traditions for recruitment of diplomats seem to co-
ordinate the recruitment of EEAS officials more firmly than member-states with few 
domestic capacities and traditions for diplomatic recruitment. Similarly, the Commission’s 
tradition of calling upon policy experts rather than diplomats is also reflected in the 
recruitment of domestic diplomatic personnel to the EEAS. 
Clearly, in order to fully grasp the institutional architecture and implications of the EEAS 
there is a need to establish comprehensive databases. The research reported here could 
effectively be accompanied by studies on decision-making within the EEAS, how it relates 
with the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, how it co-ordinates 
external representation of the Union, etc. Such research would also allow to fill several 
pages of the ‘new chapter in the story of the EU’s diplomatic story’ (Carta 2012: 167), 
which the EEAS supposedly is. Future studies of the EEAS should also aim to facilitate a 
sub-disciplinary dialogue between scholarly fields such as International Relations, public 
administration, and law. Also, in order for these fields to fully grasp the institutional 
innovation that the EEAS represents, this scholarship needs to go beyond paradigmatic 
sub-disciplinary turf wars – or merely mutual ignorance. In order for both of these 
ambitions to be realized, we think that theoretical advances in our understanding of the 
EEAS should breath from a varied menu of complementary theoretical lenses from social 
and legal sciences (e.g. Zahariadis 2013). 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 Member states’ potential influence on decisions taken by an international organisation can take 
both formal and informal forms. With independence we therefore mean the extent to which an 
international organisation (here, the EEAS) in practice (e.g. regarding its recruitment of 
personnel) is not swayed by member states’ formal or informal influence, and thus remains 
autonomous from key components of an intergovernmental administrative order.  
2 The empirical analysis relies on information obtained from 29 semi-structured interviews with 31 
respondents conducted, recorded and transcribed by the authors. These interviews (referred to as 
Interviews 1-29 below to maintain confidentiality) took place between March 2011 and February 
2012 either via telephone (19 interviews) or face-to-face (8 interviews), and lasted between 30 and 
95 minutes. Due to time constraints, two interviewees only provided written answers to the 
questions in our interview guide. While anonymity was requested by all our respondents, non-
response proved to be a minor concern (although we sometimes needed to repeatedly contact our 
targeted respondent for an appointment). To allow us to cross-validate the obtained information, 
respondents were not only asked to provide information about their own institution, but also about 
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their opinions regarding the activities of other member-states and the EEAS’ Human Resources 
directorate.  
3 Although the Commission had no foreign policy competencies and as such had no embassies, it 
maintained ‘representations’ in 136 countries. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
conferred a legal identity on the EU, these were transformed into EU ‘delegations’ (i.e., 
embassies). 
4 Both the characteristics of the initially proposed CCA (i.e., no member-state involvement), and 
the way it was brought forward (i.e., no input requested from member-states in its 
development), signaled that the EEAS saw the CCA as ‘their prerogative (…) [which] member-
states should not mingle in’ (Interview 3; also Interview 19). Interestingly, a similar approach was 
taken by Baroness Ashton with the introduction of new rules for the secondment of member-
state officials into EEAS: ‘The change in secondment rules has been passed by Ms. Ashton and 
her Headquarters, but not announced or anything’ (Interview 3). 
